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Nietzsche among the Modernists:  
The Case of Wyndham Lewis
Shane Weller
Lewis and Nietzsche: Antithetical Views
The first phase of Nietzsche’s influence on European phi-
losophy, politics, and literature began in earnest only in the 
last decade of the nineteenth century, gathering considerable 
momentum in the early decades of the twentieth century, and 
reaching a height, in Germany, in the early 1930s, when his 
thought was effectively appropriated by the ideologues of the 
Nazi Party, principally through the stewardship of Alfred Baeum-
ler, professor of philosophy in Berlin from 1933 to 1945 and 
author of Nietzsche der Philosoph und Politiker (Nietzsche the 
Philosopher and Politician [1931]).1 Reacting against Baeumler’s 
reading of Nietzsche, Martin Heidegger delivered a major se-
ries of lectures on the philosopher between 1936 and 1940 at 
the University of Freiburg, culminating in a critical analysis of 
Nietzsche’s conception of “European nihilism.” Within the ambit 
of English literature, however, perhaps no writer of the first half 
of the twentieth century has more often been seen as under the 
influence of both Nietzsche’s thought and his style than Wynd-
ham Lewis (1882–1957). Indeed, for almost all commentators on 
Lewis’s oeuvre, Nietzsche remains an absolutely decisive figure, 
although the precise nature of Nietzsche’s influence on Lewis 
has tended to be conceived in two, more or less diametrically 
opposed, ways.
On the one hand, there is the position exemplified by John 
Carey in his 1992 book The Intellectuals and the Masses. Here, 
in a chapter provocatively entitled “Wyndham Lewis and Hit-
ler,” Carey identifies Lewis as essentially Nietzschean in order 
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626 simply to dismiss him out of hand. In an act of radical literary decanonization, Carey 
claims that in his early career Lewis “greatly admired” Nietzsche, an admiration un-
reservedly reflected in Lewis’s 1917 essay “The Code of a Herdsman,” at the heart of 
which is a distinction between “the herd” and “the mountain people,” the latter being 
called upon to “mock the herd perpetually with the grimace of its own garrulity or 
deadness” and to “eschew all clichés implying a herd personality.”2 In the briefest of 
analyses, Carey argues that in “The Code of a Herdsman” Lewis simply “adopts the 
familiar Nietzschean symbolic landscape.”3 There is much in Lewis’s oeuvre to sup-
port Carey’s claim that Lewis remains an essentially Nietzschean thinker: in addition 
to his privileging of an intellectual élite over the many, there is his early rejection of 
democracy, his celebration of what in the first issue of Blast (June 1914) he terms the 
“proud, handsome and predatory,” his Vorticist conception of the “northern”—“We 
assert that the art for these climates, then, must be a northern flower”; “Tragic humour 
is the birthright of the North”—his unremitting polemicism, and, perhaps above all, 
his foundational distinction between the artist or, more precisely, the artist-intellectual 
and the “average” or “common” man.4
What Carey leaves out of account, however, no doubt because it does not fit quite so 
neatly into his own polemical discourse on the modern, is the host of complications that 
render any simple connection between the “Nietzschean symbolic landscape,” Lewis, 
and Nazism decidedly problematical. For instance, even in “The Code of a Herdsman” 
Lewis is already barring the “mountain people” from the realm of the political: “Do 
not play with political notions, aristocratisms or the reverse, for that is a compromise 
with the herd” (EWL, 27). We shall have reason to return to this banning of the artist-
intellectual from the political, and indeed the possibility of an art that would be free 
of any political position. Secondly, and no less significantly, point 16 of “The Code” 
reads: “Contradict yourself. In order to live, you must remain broken up” (EWL, 29). 
It is contradiction, polemical energy turned back on the self and on the coherence of 
that self’s work, that is one of the structuring-destructuring principles of Lewis’s entire 
oeuvre. Indeed, the very repetitiveness of that oeuvre, upon which Carey remarks 
so dismissively, is arguably the repetitiveness of an iteration that, paradoxically, both 
reinforces and weakens its argument.
Furthermore, in order to reduce the early Lewis to no more than an acolyte of 
Nietzsche, Carey has to give the shortest of shrifts to the almost unremitting critique 
of Nietzsche that is to be found in Lewis’s major works of the 1920s and 1930s. Of 
this critique, to which I shall turn shortly, Carey declares that it is to be explained as 
a typically Nietzschean élitist reaction on Lewis’s part to the increasing popularity of 
Nietzsche in intellectual and artistic circles in the 1920s, and that, despite the “res-
ervations” expressed by Lewis regarding Nietzsche in The Art of Being Ruled (1926) 
and elsewhere, Nietzsche “continued to be a potent influence on Lewis.”5 One of the 
ironies of Carey’s summary analysis of Lewis’s relation to Nietzsche, an irony of which 
Carey himself shows not the least awareness, is that it repeats Lewis’s own polemicism, 
leaving us not with an answer to Lewis’s relation to Nietzsche but rather with the task of 
tracing, with considerably more attention to the textual details of the case, the history 
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up to the outbreak of war with Nazi Germany in 1939 and Lewis’s own attempt to think 
Nietzsche’s relation to fascism in The Hitler Cult (1939).
Before beginning that analysis, however, it is first necessary to consider the other 
way in which Lewis’s relation to Nietzsche has been read in recent years. For, radically 
opposed to Carey’s strategy of tarring Lewis with Nietzscheanism (as a kind of proto-
fascism or proto-Nazism), there is the position taken by more theoretically informed 
commentators such as Toby Foshay, Paul Edwards, and Andrzej Gàsiorek. Whereas 
Carey identifies Lewis as Nietzschean in order to dismiss him, both Foshay and Gàsiorek 
identify Lewis as Nietzschean in order to save him, not least from his association with 
fascism. Crucially, however, they would save him not as a modernist but rather as a 
postmodernist. This reading depends not only upon a reinterpretation of Lewis, but also 
upon a reinterpretation of Nietzsche, a reinterpretation that ironically finds its specific 
point of origin in Fredric Jameson’s 1979 monograph on Lewis, Fables of Aggression: 
Wyndham Lewis: The Modernist as Fascist. The Lewis that Jameson presents to us 
is characterized by a “consistent perversity”; Lewis becomes an antinomic figure at 
the very heart of the modernist movement, “at one and the same time the exemplary 
practitioner of one of the most powerful of all modernistic styles and an aggressive 
ideological critic and adversary of modernism itself in all its forms.”6 Commentators 
following Jameson’s lead on Lewis, while trying to free him (as Lewis would try to free 
himself) from the “modernist as fascist” label, have sought to identify in this “consis-
tent perversity” not a self-contradictory, self-defeating, or incoherent modernism, but 
rather a fully-fledged postmodernism at the heart of modernism. The central thesis 
of Foshay’s 1992 monograph on Lewis, for instance, is that he “represents a strain of 
post-aestheticist writing that differs significantly from what has come to be defined as 
‘modernist’.”7 Paul Edwards, in his magisterial Wyndham Lewis: Painter and Writer 
(2000), claims that Lewis’s work offers “the most comprehensive critique we have of 
the modernist urge to overcome our dereliction by violently breaking through to a 
realm of authenticity, a reality transcending our divided condition.”8 Lewis’s critique 
of the dream of transcendence would extend not only to his familiar bête noire, Henri 
Bergson, but also to Nietzsche and in particular his theory of the “Overman” (“Über-
mensch”). If, as early as 1912, Lewis is “freeing himself from the confines of Bergson 
and Nietzsche,” he is, according to Edwards, never simply Nietzschean in his outlook: 
“he always mistrusted the slightly hysterical optimism of Bergson and Nietzsche, with 
their unrealistic visions of transcendence.”9
For commentators such as Foshay and Edwards, then, the postmodernity of Lewis’s 
critique of modernism from within lies in its resistance to grand narratives, to the dream 
of transcendence, to the very idea of authenticity, and to the modernist surface-and-
depth model, in favor of what Lewis himself terms an “externalist art”—which is to say, 
the art of a pure surface that hides no depth at all: in other words, a postmodern art of 
the simulacrum.10 Such an externalist art would be ideally suited to Lewis’s conception of 
the human as a figure without depth or (borrowing from Artaud) a body without organs. 
This break with the metaphor of depth or interiority is marked as early as The Caliph’s 
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628 Design (1919), at least with regard to the “common man”: “The life of the crowd, of the 
common or garden man, is exterior. He can only live through others, outside himself. 
He, in a sense, is the houses, the railings, the bunting or absence of bunting. His beauty 
and justification is in a superficial exterior life. His health is there.”11
In his recent monograph on Lewis, Andrzej Gàsiorek follows very much in Foshay’s 
and Edwards’s footsteps, arguing that Lewis’s oeuvre is essentially self-deconstructive. 
Again, at the heart of this rereading—or, more precisely, this revaluation—of Lewis 
there lies the figure of Nietzsche. Agreeing with Carey’s claim that Nietzsche was “a 
huge early influence” on Lewis, Gàsiorek nonetheless proceeds to argue that Lewis 
carefully distinguishes two strands in Nietzsche’s thought. On the one hand, there is 
the Nietzsche who calls for a revaluation of all values (Umwertung alle Werte): with 
this Nietzsche, Lewis would be in full agreement. On the other hand, there is the Ni-
etzsche who privileges the Dionysian over the Apollonian: with this second Nietzsche, 
the deconstructive Lewis will have no truck:
In common with other writers and artists, Lewis followed Nietzsche in urging the complete 
revaluation of European modernity and arguing for a transformative creativity capable 
of reimagining and reinventing the present. But he systematically rejected all arts of and 
philosophies of a dionysian hue, on the grounds that their search for cultural renewal 
entailed the collapsing of subject/object distinctions and depended on the mistaken be-
lief that regeneration may be brought about when the intellectual is abandoned and the 
subject achieves union with a mystically conceived élan vital.12
If Gàsiorek appears rather unhelpfully to conflate Nietzsche with Bergson here, this is 
justified, at least in part, by Lewis himself doing something very similar on numerous 
occasions, and perhaps most insistently in Time and Western Man (1927). Having em-
phasized Lewis’s critical distance from the “Dionysian” Nietzsche, Gàsiorek proceeds to 
argue for a Lewis who is quite simply antithetical to Carey’s Nietzschean-fascist stooge. 
Gàsiorek’s Lewis is a writer and an artist whose best work is governed by a principle 
of heteronomy, an openness to alterity not despite, but through, its very polemicism: 
“in the main,” Gàsiorek concludes, Lewis “resisted the abject fantasy that one can 
become other in favour of a deconstructive strategy that sought to reinscribe otherness 
within the discourses that excluded it, thus mocking spurious conceptions of cultural 
homogeneity and making ‘the West’ other to itself.”13
So it is, then, that we now have two antithetical Lewises to contend with, both 
thoroughly indebted to Nietzsche, although the postmodern or deconstructive Lewis is 
indebted either to a Nietzsche who is already self-deconstructing or to a Nietzsche who 
has been split in two. For all their obvious differences, however, both of the above takes 
on Lewis—that is to say, the attack on and the defense of Lewis—tend to obscure the 
many complications and paradoxes of Lewis’s response to Nietzsche’s thought. These 
complications and these paradoxes are at their greatest when it comes to the question 
of nihilism—that “uncanniest of all guests” (“unheimlichste aller Gäste”), according 
to Nietzsche.14 Indeed, it is the fate of this concept in Lewis’s own work that marks an 
indebtedness to Nietzsche that is arguably more significant than any other.
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they certainly enter the main stream of modern European thought through him, and in 
particular through his On the Genealogy of Morals (1887), which Lewis certainly read, 
and Book One (“European Nihilism”) of the fragments published posthumously under 
the title The Will to Power (1901). As for Lewis’s own deployment of the term “nihil-
ism,” in his early critique of Nietzsche in The Art of Being Ruled (1926) he refers not 
to nihilism as such but rather to “Schopenhauerian pessimism.” In Time and Western 
Man, the terms “nihilistic” and “nihilism” each occur only once. “Nihilistic despair” 
is used in a section focusing on Nietzsche’s Genealogy of Morals, from which Lewis 
takes the term.15 And, in his conclusion, Lewis again draws on the Genealogy when 
he claims that science is “nihilism” in that it produces an object-world that “‘exists’ 
in the same sense and on the same level of reality as the image”; in other words, sci-
ence produces a world that is strictly speaking “unreal” (TWM, 443). Lewis’s study of 
Shakespeare, The Lion and the Fox (1927), contains a brief chapter on “Shakespeare’s 
Nihilism,” and this chapter is important not least because it is the only occasion on 
which Lewis anticipates the postmodern gesture of Baudrillard or Gianni Vattimo by 
deploying nihilism as a value. Taking issue with A. C. Bradley’s claim that the ending 
of King Lear contains an irony that leads not to despair but to “christian optimism,” 
Lewis argues that the “punctual arrival of Cordelia, brought in like a Christmas pres-
ent, so narquois and so pat, cannot be anything but what it forces us at once to see it 
as: an expression of the poet’s mockery at the vanity of human supplications, and no-
tions of benevolent powers, of whom we are the cherished children.”16 According to 
Lewis, then, Shakespeare’s nihilism would liberate us from a childish fantasy of, and 
dependence upon, the divine. If Lewis’s use of the term “nihilism” is significant here 
precisely because nihilism is on this unique occasion presented as a liberating negation, 
it is only in the long essay “The Diabolical Principle,” first published in the third and, 
as it proved, final issue of Lewis’s review The Enemy (1927–29), that he addresses the 
question of nihilism explicitly and in detail. Here, however, he borrows the term from 
his own enemy, Elliot Paul, to whose essay “The New Nihilism” he is responding. It 
is this “new Nihilism” that Lewis proceeds to critique in “The Diabolical Principle.” 
Before analyzing this critique, however, it is first necessary to trace Lewis’s more general 
response to Nietzsche, which frames his take on nihilism.
Lewis versus Nietzsche: Limited Difference
Those commentators who insist that Lewis distinguishes clearly between two strands 
in Nietzsche’s thought are relying on numerous declarations of just such a distinction 
in Lewis’s own works. One of the last of these occurs in Lewis’s late autobiography, 
Rude Assignment (1950), in which he states:
Nietzsche was, I believe, the paramount influence, as was the case with so many people 
prior to world war i.  . . .  But for me Nietzsche was, with Schopenhauer, a thinker more 
immediately accessible to a Western mind than the other Germans, whose barbarous 
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I daresay, found in the author of “Zarathustra” a sort of titanic nourishment for the ego: 
treating in fact this great hysteric as a power-house. At present that is what I like least about 
Nietzsche: and I was reasonably immune then to Superman. The impulse to titanism and 
supernatural afflatus pervading German romanticism has never had any interest for me. 
On the other hand that side of his genius which expressed itself in “La Gaya Scienza,” or 
those admirable maxims, rather resembling Butler’s “Notebooks,” which he wrote after 
the breakdown in his health, were among my favourite reading in those years.17
What is not spelled out here is that by 1939 Lewis had come to see Nietzsche “the 
great hysteric” as the intellectual father of fascism, radically opposed to that other 
Nietzsche, the “good European,” the father of an internationalism with which Lewis 
would associate himself after his disillusionment with nationalism. As we shall see, the 
distinction that Lewis makes both in Rude Assignment and elsewhere between two 
strands in Nietzsche becomes a way of making sense of his own intellectual history. That 
the concept of nihilism will survive all these discriminations, however, is a fact that has 
tended to remain unremarked upon in commentaries on Lewis, be they attacks upon, 
or defenses of, his oeuvre. And it is in the fate of the concept of nihilism in his work, 
not in the distinction he makes between two strands in Nietzsche’s thought, that both 
Lewis’s debt to Nietzsche and the limits of his reading of Nietzsche lie.
As Paul Edwards observes, Lewis first read Nietzsche (not in the original German, 
but in French translation) at roughly the same time as he was reading Bergson, and was 
soon deploying him in his critique of Italian Futurism. In the first issue of his Vorticist 
review, Blast, for instance, Nietzsche is neither blessed nor blasted, but appears by 
name in an attack on Filippo Marinetti: “His war-talk, sententious elevation and much 
besides, Marinetti picked up from Nietzsche.”18 Nietzsche returns, ever so slightly 
masked, in The Caliph’s Design (1919) as that “German philosopher” who subscribes 
to the notion of an “aesthetic justification of the universe,” an idea treated, if not with 
mockery, at least with skepticism, by Lewis:
A German philosopher, living in the heyday of last century German music, accepted the 
theory of an aesthetic justification of the universe. Many people play with this notion, 
just as they play with Art. But we should have to disembarrass “art” of a good deal of 
cheap adhesive matter, and cheap and pretty adhesive people, before it could appear a 
justification for anything at all; much less for such a gigantic and, from every point of view, 
dubious concern as the Universe!19
The allusion here is to the following, celebrated statement in Nietzsche’s first book, 
The Birth of Tragedy (1872): “It is only as an aesthetic phenomenon that existence and 
the world are eternally justified.”20
The first extended analysis of Nietzsche’s thought by Lewis occurs in Part IV (“Vul-
garization and Political Decay”) of The Art of Being Ruled (1926). Surprisingly—at 
least for those who consider Lewis an out-and-out Nietzschean, or who would contrast 
his attitude to Nietzsche with his attitude to Bergson and the other “time-philoso-
phers”—Lewis’s reaction to Nietzsche here is scarcely less negative than his reaction 
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pantheon (including all the major literary modernists, from Pound to Eliot to Joyce 
to Woolf), Nietzsche is the target of polemical attack by Lewis. In The Art of Being 
Ruled, Nietzsche is identified as “the archetype of the vulgarizer.”21 The object of his 
vulgarization is “the notion of aristocracy and power,” which, Lewis argues, is “surely 
the most absurd, illogical, and meaningless thing that he could have chosen for that 
purpose” (ABR, 113). By “vulgarization” here, Lewis means at once popularization 
and devaluation: Nietzsche leads the populace to believe in its own aristocratic nature, 
thereby negating the very principle of the aristos. In this act of vulgarization, Nietzsche 
might be said to be the first properly modern philosopher. In The Art of Being Ruled, 
Nietzsche forms an unholy trinity with the two other great “vulgarizers” of the mod-
ern age: Bergson and Freud. Through an argument that is itself clearly a repetition of 
Nietzsche’s own strategy, Lewis turns Nietzsche back against himself, making of the 
self-declared anti-Christian Nietzsche a philosopher of Christian humility: “Nietzsche 
was in fact himself, where philosophy was concerned, a sort of Christ” (ABR, 114). What 
Lewis means by this is that Nietzsche preaches, self-contradictorily, an aristocratism 
that is open to all, the empirical proof of this being the sudden waxing of Nietzsche’s 
posthumous star: “A few years after his dramatic exit from the stage he became the 
greatest popular success of any philosopher of modern times” (ABR, 114); in this, 
Nietzsche anticipates the popularity of both Bergson and Freud in the early decades 
of the twentieth century.
However, if Lewis’s attack on the popular (because vulgarizing) Nietzsche is in fact 
scarcely less virulent than his attacks on Bergson, this is not because Lewis is simply 
opposed to Nietzsche rather than (as Carey argues) neatly aligned with him. The tar-
gets of Lewis’s polemics are precisely those figures with whom he shares something 
essential, and Lewis certainly finds “truths” in Nietzsche, not least the “truth” of that 
depthless surface which underlies Lewis’s own externalist aesthetic. Later in The Art 
of Being Ruled, for instance, Lewis declares: “that we are surface creatures, is the truth 
that Nietzsche insisted on so wisely” (ABR, 231). More generally, however, one might 
argue that Lewis’s polemos, a polemos that includes Nietzsche while being governed 
by him, takes the form of what Derrida in his later work terms “autoimmunization,” 
which is to say, a procedure whereby the self (autos) turns back on itself suicidally, 
ruining its own integrity.22 Nietzsche, then, as Lewis’s polemical other, is none other 
than Lewis himself, or at least a certain Lewis. And, crucially, for Lewis to constitute 
himself as a theorist of “Vulgarization and Political Decay”—in other words, as a 
theorist of what he will later term “nihilism”—he has to engage in this radical act of 
self-separation or self-aggression, by way of a certain Nietzsche, a Nietzsche himself 
split by Lewis into, on the one hand, the great vulgarizer and, on the other hand, the 
truth-bearer, the philosopher who articulates the truth of the depthless surface, which 
calls for the very externalist art that Lewis himself will aim both to theorize and to 
practice, most elaborately in The Apes of God (1930). Lewis’s polemos with Nietzsche, 
then, is not simply the expression of a rampant individualism (as Carey claims), but 
rather a practice of autoimmunizing self-assertion that would deconstitute the very 
thing it serves to constitute.
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the heart of that critique concerns the will to power (Wille zur Macht), which Lewis, 
anticipating Heidegger, identifies as “the central feature of his thought” (ABR, 117). 
Nietzsche’s theory of the will to power is, he argues, inextricably rooted in the “Will-
school” of philosopher, and thus can be traced back to Schopenhauer. In his attempt 
to overcome Schopenhauer’s “pessimism of thought and knowledge,” Nietzsche pro-
poses a countering “affirmation” that is essentially the expression of a “will to action” 
directed against the intellect, which is to say against Lewis’s own principal value. The 
will to power itself is simply surplus energy, above and beyond the energy required 
for the Darwinian “struggle for existence.” In Nietzsche, this surplus (or “creative”) 
energy is not invested in art, which is where, according to Lewis (and indeed a certain 
Nietzsche), it should be invested; rather, this surplus energy is reinvested in the very 
struggle that it exceeds. This, according to Lewis, is Nietzsche’s great failing, the failing 
that Lewis’s own work would correct:
Any criticism of Nietzsche must rest on that point: that of his suggested employment and 
utilization of this superfluous energy to go on doing the same things that we should be 
doing without it.  . . .  He was so impregnated with the pessimism of Schopenhauer, and 
his health was so broken by his experiences in the Franco-Prussian War, that he could not 
imagine, really, the mind doing anything else with itself than what it did in post-darwin-
ian or schopenhauerian pessimism: to just go on contemplating the horrors of existence. 
And in reality the will to enjoy was dead in Nietzsche, much as he clamoured for latin 
light-heartedness. He had plenty of Will left: only, it was Will to struggle merely, not Will 
to live. (ABR, 118)
In other words, Nietzsche remains fixated by, and imprisoned within, the very nihilism 
that he was the first both to diagnose and to attempt to overcome. Lewis’s Nietzsche is 
the first of the great reinvestors in European nihilism, the first of the great reinvestors 
in that greatest of devaluations, that absolute devaluation of the “highest values” which 
reduces existence to “horror.” The ambivalence of Lewis’s own relation to Nietzsche is 
to be understood, then, not simply in terms of an élitism that could not abide sharing 
its preferences, but more fundamentally in terms of a nihilism that Nietzsche diagnoses 
but from which he is unable to free himself. That Nietzsche himself was not unaware 
of this is suggested, of course, by his description of nihilism as the “uncanniest of all 
guests.” Given such an analysis of Nietzsche, it is scarcely surprising that in his later 
works Lewis should repeatedly associate Nietzsche with the “time-philosophers” (above 
all, Bergson) and the art of music (an inward, temporal art, the very antithesis of that 
“externalist” art advocated by Lewis). In an irony that (as we shall see) returned to haunt 
Lewis himself, Nietzsche, the great diagnostician of European nihilism, is aligned with 
the very nihilism against which his great “affirmation” was supposed to militate.
At times, however, the autoimmunizing Nietzsche of The Art of Being Ruled is 
presented by Lewis as a rather less complicated figure. Already in Time and Western 
Man (1927), Nietzsche is being presented, like Bergson, as no more than a child of 
Darwin, having applied the Darwinian theory of natural selection to the political and 
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Lewis is prepared to accept Spengler’s identification of Nietzsche as simply Darwinian: 
“That Nietzsche’s thundering and screaming is purely ‘darwinian’: that Darwin means 
‘Progress of the Species’ (what Carlyle thundered about): that seems quite true” (TWM, 
286).23 Later in Time and Western Man, Lewis again identifies Nietzsche’s failings: 
“Nietzsche had very little in his composition of the health, balance, measure, and fine 
sense of the antique world (of Spengler’s ‘Classical’ and Goethe’s before him) towards 
which he turned so often: he had much more of the frantic, intolerant fanaticism of a 
genevan reformer or an Old Testament prophet” (TWM, 352). Ultimately, however, 
it is Nietzsche’s solution to the experience of nihilism that Lewis will reject, not his 
epochal diagnosis of it:
the very fundamental question of whether we should set out to transcend our human con-
dition (as formerly Nietzsche and Bergson claimed that we should); or whether we should 
translate into human terms the whole of our datum. My standpoint is that we are creatures 
of a certain kind, with no indication that a radical change is imminent; and that the most 
pretentious of our present prophets is unable to do more than promise an “eternity of 
intoxication” to those who follow him into less physical, more “cosmic,” regions; proposals 
made with at least equal eloquence by the contemporaries of Plato. (TWM, 110)
In an irony the measure of which it is far from easy to take, Nietzsche, the first great 
diagnostician of nihilism, becomes its very incarnation, in the very solution he proposes 
to it. That this notion will only reinforce itself in the course of Lewis’s development 
is apparent from the following remark in Rude Assignment: “It is most necessary to 
make it very clear that there is not the least taint of Uebermenschlichkeit anywhere 
in my mind” (RA, 203). That the notion of the “Overman” would be considered a 
“taint” by Lewis can be explained by his own attempt to free himself from the taint of 
fascism. As he makes clear in The Hitler Cult (1939), Lewis considers the Nietzsche 
who theorizes the “Overman” as an “ancestor” of Nazism. Having quoted approvingly 
a passage on the “good European” from Nietzsche’s The Gay Science (1882; revised 
edition, 1887), Lewis states:
It is mere impudence on the part of the Nazi doctrinaires to claim a man with such views 
as these as a precursor: though, of course, Nietzsche was a dual personality. There was a 
side of him that conforms to the Nazi pattern. Whereas one-half of him reviled the empty 
imperialism imposed by Prussia upon the rest of Germany—“that system of politics which 
makes the German nation barren, by making it vain”—the other half allowed itself to 
become intoxicated with hallucinations of power. So it was that he became the outstand-
ing prophet of war-for-war’s-sake. He gave intellectual currency to the military dictum of 
the Prussian—that what we call “peace” is merely intervals interrupting a state of war. As 
such the Nazi imperialist can claim him as an ancestor.24
According to Lewis, then—whose own intoxications or hallucinations regarding Nazism 
he is attempting to leave behind in The Hitler Cult—Nietzsche anticipates Nazism 
precisely through his response or solution to the threat of nihilism, not through his 
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nihilism from the discourse of the political (that is, nineteenth-century Russian nihil-
ism) and his redeployment of that concept within philosophy.
Lewis and the Struggle Against Modern European Nihilism
It would not be particularly difficult to demonstrate that Lewis’s entire oeuvre is in 
fact nothing less than an unremitting critique of nihilism in one form or another. In this 
respect, one might argue that the influence of Nietzsche upon him remains absolute. 
Certainly, Lewis’s critique of the “time-philosophers” and the “time-mind” in Time and 
Western Man can be read as a critique of nihilism, given that for Lewis that which is 
hypostatized by the modern “time-mind” is quite simply “Nothing”: “Time as change 
was the ‘Nothing’ of the Greek, and it is ours. Space is rapidly, under the guidance 
of a series of Bergsons, each Time-obsessed, becoming the ‘Nothing’ of the modern 
European” (TWM, 418). As mentioned above, however, Lewis first devotes a sustained 
analysis to a phenomenon that he explicitly terms “nihilism” in the 1929 essay “The 
Diabolical Principle.” This essay is a response to an article by Elliot Paul entitled “The 
New Nihilism,” published in the second issue (May 1927) of the Paris-based magazine 
transition, of which Paul was, together with Eugene Jolas, the coeditor. 
In “The New Nihilism,” Paul claims that a new movement in the arts has finally 
declared itself, a “new Nihilism” that enacts a productive negation of all existing literary 
forms, values, and institutions. These new nihilists include Stein and Joyce, but they 
find their most explicit spokesperson in the French writer Pierre Drieu La Rochelle 
(1893–1945), the first chapter of whose work Le Jeune Européen (The Young European) 
was published in an English translation by Elliot Paul in the same issue of transition. 
For Paul, then, “nihilism” is not a pejorative term, as it is for Lewis, but rather to be 
associated with nineteenth-century Russian nihilism in the sense that it breaks with the 
existing institutions (for Russian nihilism these institutions were principally political; 
for the “new Nihilism” they are aesthetic, moral, and metaphysical as well). Through a 
productive negation, “new Nihilism” breaks with the “humanist” or “Christian” concep-
tion of man and with the literary forms that correspond to that humanism. According 
to Paul, Drieu La Rochelle’s “young European” is nihilist in his absolute rejection of 
the “Christian spirit,” those “old values” of universal “brotherhood” that have been 
exposed by the inhuman horrors of the First World War. La Rochelle’s “nihilism” re-
flects the “perfect inhumanity” that has come to light with the war. His is a literature 
that is “completely dehumanized” and functions “in a sphere which knows neither 
morals nor compassion.” This dehumanization is not to be confused, however, with 
the superhumanization theorized by Nietzsche: “The new hero neither feels nor shows 
superiority, only an utter amorality and a clear head which finds futility everywhere 
and accepts it as a natural law.” The “new Nihilism” “renounces Christ and Nietzsche 
as if both were schoolboys.”25
The extracts from Paul’s own translation of the opening chapter of Drieu La 
Rochelle’s Young European that are included in Paul’s essay on “The New Nihilism” 
Weller / nietzsche among the modernists
635undoubtedly exhibit traits that foreshadow La Rochelle’s subsequent commitment to 
fascism and his rejection of both liberal democracy and communism:26
The violence of men. They are born only for war, as women are made to have children. 
All the rest is a tardy detail of the imagination which has already shot its bolt.  . . .  Man 
need never have left the forest: he is a degenerate, nostalgic animal.
It is necessary to have killed with the hands to understand life. The only life of which men 
are capable, I tell you again, is the spilling of blood: murder and coitus. All the rest is but 
the fag end of the course, decadence.
I had deceived myself. The Russian revolution was not at all as I had believed. Those 
Jews thought only of making themselves Americans, only, like the Germans of 1914, they 
went about it awkwardly.27
Lewis’s critique of Paul’s argument in favor of a “new Nihilism” forms part of his ongoing 
polemic against all the major modernists, a polemic that finds its first major expression 
in Time and Western Man, which contains a long essay on Ulysses, and is reinforced 
in a sequence of essays on Hemingway, Faulkner, Pound, Eliot, James, and Woolf in 
Men Without Art (1934). There are numerous aspects to Lewis’s critique, but not the 
least of these is his claim that the “new Nihilism” is in fact not new at all. Just as the 
other so-called moderns are, in Lewis’s eyes, rooted in the nineteenth century and, 
beyond that, in the “time-philosophy” which is itself nihilist through and through, so 
the “new Nihilism” does not go beyond the Russian nihilism from which it borrows its 
name, and (within the literary) it does no more than repeat such nineteenth-century 
diabolists as Lautréamont and Rimbaud. Lewis places particular emphasis upon the link 
between Lautréamont (and the other “diabolical” writers) and Nietzsche: in both, he 
argues, there is a “will to power” or a “power-complex” that operates through a simple 
reversal of the Christian ethos, a reversal that changes nothing at all. Christian and 
anti-Christian are two sides of the one nihilist coin: “Such men as [Lautréamont] are 
in fact inverted moralists, as was well seen in the case of Nietzsche.”28 If the writers 
associated with the “revolution of the word” heralded by transition magazine are merely 
“sham revolutionaries,” repeating the diabolism of Lautréamont et alia, then the “new 
Nihilists” are quite simply the old nihilists in avant-garde artists’ clothing.
No less important to Lewis’s critique, however, is the claim that, for all Nietzsche’s 
appropriation of the term for a philosophical discourse, nihilism cannot in fact be freed 
from its roots in the political. For this reason, Paul’s championing of a “new Nihilism” is 
quite simply a politicization of art, and that, for Lewis, is the most disastrously nihilistic 
gesture of all. Indeed, according to Lewis, the very essence of modern European nihil-
ism lies precisely in the politicization of art, the negation of art’s autonomy from the 
political as the discourse of the polis: “The politicisation of art is a catastrophe of the 
same order as the politicisation of science” (E, 68). According to Lewis, then, nihilism 
is political in its essence, and this is true not only of the “Russian Nihilism” critiqued 
by both Turgenev in Fathers and Sons (1861) and Dostoevsky in The Possessed (1871), 
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entire oeuvre is unified by the attempt to save art from the political, to save the creative 
intellect (as subject, mind, or psyche) in its freedom. As the ostensibly disparate analy-
ses of Time and Western Man make clear, he sees this freedom as being threatened 
in the modern period by a host of mechanist theories: these include, but are certainly 
not limited to, Leibniz’s concept of the unconscious, Schopenhauer’s doctrine of the 
will, Darwin’s theory of the struggle for existence, Nietzsche’s will to power, Bergson’s 
concept of élan vital, Spengler’s historicism, William James’s theory of the stream of 
consciousness, and behaviorist psychology. What “The Diabolical Principle” helps to 
clarify is that, above all, it is in the politicization of art, and of the creative intellect 
that finds expression in art, that modern European nihilism (as Lewis conceives of it) 
finds its essence, and this is because modernity is for Lewis the “political age,” while 
art remains (transhistorically) the purest form of expression for the intellect in its 
freedom. In short, the struggle against nihilism in the modern age is, for Lewis, above 
all the struggle—or the polemos—between art and politics.
Nihilism, as Lewis conceives it, then, is to be understood not as a spirit of negation 
directed against the Christian humanist conception of humanity as a “brotherhood,” 
not as amorality or lack of compassion, and not even (indeed, above all not) as the inhu-
man, a category that Lewis aims to recuperate for his own art of satire, together with 
the idea of the “non-moral,” in Men Without Art. Rather, nihilism will be defined by 
Lewis as the negation of art’s autonomy, the contamination of both art and the intellect 
by the political. What Lewis in “The Diabolical Principle” terms the “New Philistine,” 
by which he means, among others, Elliot Paul, Eugene Jolas, and those writers cham-
pioned by transition, is, then, closely akin to the old “Philistine” of Matthew Arnold’s 
Culture and Anarchy (1869) in that, just as the Arnoldian “Philistine” fails to achieve 
disinterestedness, Lewis’s “New Philistine” fails to recognize art’s necessary autonomy 
from the political, to recognize that “to root politics out of art is a highly necessary 
undertaking” (E, 28–29). As for Lewis’s own political position in this attack on a nihil-
ism defined as the politicization of art, it is presented as not really a position at all, but 
rather as hybrid, miscegenated, or self-contradictory: “partly communist and partly 
fascist, with a distinct streak of monarchism in my marxism, but at bottom anarchist 
with a healthy passion for order” (E, 70).
That said, the radical distinction between art and politics, intellect and action, 
thought and power, upon which Lewis’s notion of modern European nihilism is 
founded, is a distinction that cannot be maintained, precisely because the very concept 
of nihilism itself cannot be freed from the political. To speak of nihilism is always to 
speak of the political as well as the philosophical and the aesthetic, and in Lewis this 
imbrication occurs principally through his reliance upon the concept of sovereignty 
in his thinking of both art and politics in the 1930s. His definition of nihilism as the 
politicization of art is proposed in the 1929 issue of The Enemy and published in book 
form (together with another essay, “The Dithyrambic Spectator”) in 1931, at the be-
ginning of a decade that would see Lewis address contemporary politics head-on, in a 
sequence of works whose arguments would come to serve as the principal evidence for 
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(1931), Left Wings over Europe; or, How to Make a War About Nothing (1936), and 
Count Your Dead: They are Alive!, or A New War in the Making (1937). These three 
texts, in which (as Lewis himself later acknowledges) Hitler and Nazism are treated 
sympathetically, have been described by Julian Symons as “the worst of Lewis” (EWL, 
124), and Lewis himself came to dismiss aspects of them. In an unpublished draft 
chapter of Rude Assignment, he claims that the Nazis’ nationalism “bored” him, their 
“racism” he considered a “joke,” and their militarism was “silly,” but he admits to hav-
ing “felt much sympathy” (RA, 258) for both their economic program (in particular, 
their attack on usury, or “loan-capital” as opposed to “creative-capital”) and their social 
program. Crucially, Lewis relies upon the notions (and the value) of sovereignty and 
the nation-state in his defence of Nazism, a defence energized by his anticommunism. 
In Left Wings over Europe, for instance, which was published after German troops 
had entered the demilitarized zone of the Rhineland, he argues that Hitler’s principal 
aim is simply the re-establishment of Germany as a “sovereign state, within its own 
frontiers, subject to its own law.”29 It is just such a sovereignty that, for Lewis, is also 
the defining principle of the intellect or creative intelligence and the art in which it 
finds not only its expression but also its being as transhistorical event.
That Lewis would eventually come to realize the problems entailed by deploying 
the concept of sovereignty in his thinking of the political is evident from his remarks 
upon Hitler and Left Wings over Europe in Rude Assignment: he is now “in complete 
disagreement with much of the contents of Left Wings,” in particular its “support for 
the principle of the ‘sovereign state’” and “its antagonism to all centralization of power” 
(RA, 226). Lewis continues to insist, however, that neither work is political; rather, they 
are “anti-war” (RA, 224). What he has come to realize is that sovereignty and war are 
inextricable: “until the doctrine of the ‘sovereign state’ is repudiated, there must be 
war” (RA, 225). In fact, this rejection of sovereignty as a political principle is already 
apparent in The Hitler Cult: “The more ‘sovereign states’ that cease to be sovereign the 
better for all of us. And it is not perhaps too much to hope that the fact of a common 
tongue, English, will start the rot; disintegrate these stupid barriers” (HC, 244). And 
yet, far from simply abandoning the notion of the state, Lewis proceeds to universalize 
it: abandoning the ideal of multiple sovereign states, he comes to advocate a federal-
ist world-state as the only solution to both the possibility of war and the dissolution 
of “Western culture,” that culture being something he no longer sees any reason to 
defend. And if the principle of sovereignty remains at the heart of any thinking of a 
world-state, it also remains at the heart of Lewis’s thinking of the aesthetic in its abso-
lute autonomy from the political. 
If the struggle against nihilism as Lewis conceives it calls for a rooting out of politics 
from art, the works of the 1930s suggest that it also calls for a rooting out of politics from 
the discourse of the political. In the foreword to Left Wings over Europe, for instance, 
Lewis writes: “Finally, as to the political colours under which what you are about to read 
sails. With regard to that I can set your mind at rest at once. I fly the flag of no party. 
My shirt is neither red, black, nor purple.”30 And yet, Lewis’s anticommunism drives 
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over Europe, and Count Your Dead may be “anti-war,” but that is precisely because a 
European war would, according to Lewis, result in communist hegemony in Europe. 
In an article published in the British Union Quarterly in January 1937 and addressed 
quite directly to the British fascist, Lewis insists upon his being “objective” and “de-
tached.” Studiously refusing to identify himself as a fascist, he nonetheless identifies 
Marxism as an “enormous evil” and communism as a “dark apotheosis,” whereas fas-
cism stands for “all that prospers by individual effort and creative toil.”31 Ironically, the 
explicit connection that Lewis makes here between politics and the aesthetic (that is, 
“creative toil”) is a perfect reflection of their imbrication in the Marxist theory of the 
aesthetic. The irony only deepens when one considers the fact that, while Lewis insists 
in each of his “anti-war” polemics of the mid-1930s that he is remaining “objective,” 
his first polemic against Nazism (The Hitler Cult) opens with the announcement that 
he is finally abandoning his political neutrality (HC, vii).
From transition to Existentialism; or, Nihilism’s Return
For all the many, highly significant changes that occur at the end of the 1930s in 
Lewis’s position on democracy, fascism, the nation-state and the world-state, and even 
the value of Western (or at least European) civilization, the concept of nihilism that 
he inherits from Nietzsche, and redefines to suit his own purposes, survives intact. 
Over two decades after the first publication of “The Diabolical Principle,” in a chapter 
entitled “Twentieth Century Nihilism” in The Writer and the Absolute (1952), Lewis 
once again deploys “nihilism” as a catch-all for an entire mode of thinking, namely the 
existentialism of Sartre and Camus, which he rejects as one more manifestation of that 
“time-philosophy” which now includes Heidegger, whose Being and Time (1927) would 
have made him one of Lewis’s “most valuable exhibits,” had Lewis only read him when 
writing Time and Western Man.32 Whereas in “The Diabolical Principle” nihilism’s es-
sence is taken to lie in the politicization of art, or the negation of art’s autonomy, in The 
Writer and the Absolute it appears at first glance to be defined in ontological terms as a 
philosophy that takes the ultimate ground to be the nothing (le néant). Lewis’s critique 
of Sartrean existentialism echoes his earlier critique of the “dionysian” Nietzsche. 
Existentialism is nihilistic in being an attack on “human reason”; reason and intellect 
are supplanted by the will, making of man the “acting animal” rather than the “think-
ing animal” (WA, 124). This usurpation of reason occurs through a withdrawal from 
objectivity into subjectivity, from the external into the internal world, a withdrawal that 
Lewis traces back to the epochï (or bracketing) at the heart of Husserl’s phenomenol-
ogy. What remains after the epochï is, Lewis argues, not consciousness in its purity 
but nothing, or, more precisely, the consciousness of nothing: “So—having cut himself 
off from the phenomenal world outside—in this empty shell our Existentialist flings 
himself on the floor and contemplates this echoless vacuity” (WA, 126).
If Lewis’s summary of the phenomenological reduction scarcely does justice to 
Husserl, it nonetheless appears to enable Lewis to offer a definition of nihilism that is 
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general argument of The Writer and the Absolute is precisely that art must remain 
free, and that, for all its token emphasis upon freedom, existentialism is a philosophy 
that conceives of the human as anything but free. As we have seen, according to 
Lewis, existentialism renders the human being an “acting animal,” subject to the will 
rather than to reason. In other words, existentialism takes its place in the tradition of 
philosophies of the will that can be traced back to Schopenhauer and his “pessimism.” 
With regard to art and literature, Sartre is of course the great champion of engaged 
literature (littérature engagée), whereas Lewis continues to maintain art’s absolute 
autonomy from the political: literature, he argues, should be “a kind of Switzerland; the 
‘great neutral’” (WA, 54).33 The works of Sartre and Malraux are proof that “literature 
is literally bedeviled by politics in the France of today” (WA, 67). If Camus is to be 
set apart from Sartre and Malraux as the author of novels that are “probably the best 
that are being written in France today” (WA, 66), then this is precisely because he is 
“a writer of great distinction who declares himself as not of any party: or at least desir-
ous of being that.” And yet, Lewis continues, “there is nothing in the world so difficult 
today as not belonging to a party” (WA, 67).
One might well imagine that Lewis’s insistence upon the difficulty of maintaining 
art’s autonomy from the political is owing to his own experiences in the 1930s, and yet, 
once again, the act of autoimmunization that is the signature of Lewisian polemic takes 
place by way of another, in this instance not Nietzsche but Camus. For all the atten-
tion that Lewis pays to Sartre in his critique of existentialism, it is Camus who poses 
the greater threat and who serves as the figure of that self which Lewis would expel, 
since he bears, or is made by Lewis to bear, such a close resemblance to Lewis himself. 
Not only does the French-Algerian writer seek to free himself from the political, but 
he is presented as being, like Lewis, a “thinking animal” rather than a “man-of-action 
animal” (WA, 69). Ultimately, however, Camus belongs with all the other twentieth-
century nihilists, although, crucially, his nihilism lies not in his rendering art political 
but rather in his conception of the human being as essentially irrational or absurd: in 
Camus, “the irrational—the Absurd—is an openly venerated principle” (WA, 131); “No 
work I know of is more beautifully suited to make dazzlingly clear the inner meaning of 
existentialism than L’Etranger, by Albert Camus. To the ‘Dumb Ox’ of whom I wrote 
must now be added the ‘Surd’” (WA, 131).
One of the ironies of launching such a critique of Camus—in which it is absurdity 
and not the political that renders the work nihilist—lies in the fact that in his essay 
on “The Meaning of the Wild Body” (1927), in which he establishes the fundamental 
principles for his own comic art, Lewis anticipates the postwar theory of the absurd by 
turning Bergson’s definition of laughter on its head, redefining laughter as a response 
to the absurdity of being. The absurd, as Lewis conceives it in 1927, is that for which 
there can be no logical explanation. Thus, not only might a given phenomenon be de-
scribed as absurd, when considered from a certain point of view, but being as such is 
fundamentally absurd, given that there can be no logical explanation for its emergence 
out of non-being:
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than belongs to a social differentiation. There is nothing that is animal (and we as bodies 
are animals) that is not absurd. This sense of the absurdity, or, if you like, the madness of 
our life, is at the root of every true philosophy.  . . .  It is the chasm lying between being 
and non-being, over which it is impossible for logic to throw any bridge, that, in certain 
forms of laughter, we leap. We land plumb in the centre of Nothing.34
If, from a point of philosophical vantage, being as a whole is absurd, then it goes with-
out saying that the human being is. According to Lewis, however, the absurdity of the 
human lies not only in its being as such, but also in its status as a thinking being. If his 
theory of the absurd is rooted in a dualist sense of the absolute difference between 
being and non-being, then his theory of the comic is rooted in a no less dualist sense of 
the absolute distinction between action and reason, will and thought. Just as the leap 
from non-being to being is absurd on account of its resisting all logical explanation, 
so too is the leap from body to mind, from will to thought, from action to reason—in 
other words, the leap beyond nihilism:
The root of the Comic is to be sought in the sensations resulting from the observations of 
a thing behaving like a person. But from that point of view all men are necessarily comic: 
for they are all things, or physical bodies, behaving as persons. It is only when you come to 
deny that they are “persons,” or that there is any “mind” or “person” there at all, that the 
world of appearance is accepted as quite natural, and not at all ridiculous. (WB, 158)
Whether this “absurd” leap out of nihilism is to be conceived as an action or a thought, 
as nihilist or non-nihilist, remains in question, not least because its very absurdity lies 
in its not belonging properly to either category. 
For the absurdity or ridiculousness of being, and of human being in particular, to 
become apparent, and thereby laughable, there must be a certain distance between 
the subject and the object of laughter. Human beings are only laughable when viewed 
from the outside, and indeed from an absolute outside—hence Lewis’s insistence that 
the comic art is necessarily purely “externalist.” Paradoxically, this absolute outside, 
this being-beyond-the-human, is the very essence of the human as a thinking being. 
That at which we laugh is the human as the properly human’s absolute other. To be 
properly human, then, is to be in a position to laugh at everything we spend our lives 
mistaking for the human, and this is, if not strictly speaking impossible, not only rare 
but at odds with life itself:
It is comparatively easy to see that another man, as an animal, is absurd; but it is far more 
difficult to observe oneself in that hard and exquisite light. But no man has ever continued 
to live who has observed himself in that manner for longer than a flash. Such conscious-
ness must be of the nature of a thunderbolt. Laughter is only summer-lightning. But it 
occasionally takes on the dangerous form of absolute revelation.
This fundamental self-observation, then, can never on the whole be absolute. We are not 
constructed to be absolute observers. Where it does not exist at all, men sink to the level 
of insects. (WB, 158)
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Bergson. It does not serve to identify and challenge departures from the normative. 
Rather, it is on the side of the human beyond any social, political, or normative cat-
egories. It is the experience of the human as that which transcends itself; it is a non-
position, an absolute outside, the place of art, for which there is simply nothing but 
alterity. In short, it is life beyond nihilism. And yet, the place of such properly human 
laughter at the absurdity of thinking being is precisely the nothing of pure conscious-
ness, the very nothing that Lewis will later criticize in Husserl’s phenomenology and 
Sartre’s existentialism.
At the heart of Lewis’s own conception of an externalist art, then, there is a pure 
“nothing,” and it is upon this “nothing” that his own critique of nihilism is founded. 
At this point, the very difference between the critique of nihilism and the nihilism 
that constitutes the object of that critique is subjected to a pressure that threatens 
to reduce it to nothing. What Nietzsche terms the “uncanniness” (“Unheimlichkeit”) 
of nihilism would lie, then, in that nihilism’s returning to haunt the very critique that 
Lewis would launch against it. In short, Lewis’s own oeuvre would appear to serve as 
proof, against itself, in a polemos of incessantly failing autoimmunization, that there is 
nothing more nihilist than a critique of nihilism. If Lewis’s debt to Nietzsche lies, above 
all, in his appropriation and redeployment of the concept of nihilism, then the limit 
to that debt would lie in his failure to take full account of the uncanniness of a guest 
that would shape his entire oeuvre while also reducing it in its turn to a very strange 
kind of nothing. That Heidegger exhibits a similar failure is surely rather more than 
an historical coincidence.
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